

0x0000

a great fool in my life i have been
i have squandered 'til pallid and thin
hung my head in shame
and refused to take blame
for the darkness i know i've let win

j knapp

VulnCatcher:
Fun with Programmatic Debugging
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0x0001 Who am I

- Scattered past in computing
- Insecurity Researcher
- Captain 1@stplace
- Father/Husband
- Curious fellow (sleepless too)

0x0100 Programmatic Debugging

- Debugging other processes from your (my) favorite language
- Accessing and Influencing CPU and Memory state of a process in a programmatic fashion
 - Logic and other language constructs

0x0101 Explosion

- Several key programmatic debuggers:
 - PyDBG – Pedram (part of Pai Mei)
 - Immunity Debugger – Immunity Sec
 - Vtrace – Invisigoth (Vivisect)
 - NoxDbg – Lin0xx (first Ruby debugger)

(This talk will focus on Vtrace)

0x0102 What can we do?

- Live Patching? Fun with Hex
 - LivePatch
- Live Dumping?
 - LiveOrganTransplant
- Process Grep?
 - Visi's memgrep
- Vampyre Jack SSHD
 - In progress by drb and myself

0x0103 What can we do?

- everything else that GDB or Olly can do, only better
- interactive python debugger
 - especially nice with *searchMemory()* and *traceme()*
 - *automate frame interpretation*
- *what do you **want** to do?*

0x0200 Vulnerabilities

- what can we do to encourage vulns to suddenly appear?
 - fuzzing on its own is so ghetto!
- rather, what can we watch/do to catch indications of vulnerability?

0x0300 Buffer Overflows?

- custom Breakpoints at key functions
- at break:
 - Stack-Analysis for Parameters
 - Buffer-Analysis for Size
- more empirical than static analysis

0x0301 vtrace attach

```
from vtrace import *  
me = getTrace()  
me.attach(<pid>)  
me.addBreakpoint(MemcpyBreaker(me))  
me.setMode("RunForever", True)  
me.run()
```

0x0302 memcpy()

- memccpy()/memcpy()/memmove()
 - check length of dest (%ESP + 0x4)
 - HEAP (dmalloc), check length field immediately before the pointer to the dest
 - heapptr - 4
 - not always accurate.... copying partial chunks
 - Stack, check distance to RET
 - (%ebp + 4) - dest
 - oh, if only that simple...
 - compare with Copy Size (%ESP + 0xc)

0x0303 MemcpyBreaker

```
class MemcpyBreaker(BreakpointPublisher):
    def __init__(self):
        ...
    def notify(self, event, trace):
        eip=trace.getProgramCounter()
        esp=trace.getRegisterByName('esp')
        ebp=trace.getRegisterByName('ebp')
        copylen=trace.readMemoryFormat((esp + 0xc), AddrFmt)[0]
        retptr =trace.readMemoryFormat((esp + 0x0), AddrFmt)[0]
        dest    =trace.readMemoryFormat((esp + 0x4), AddrFmt)[0]
        src     =trace.readMemoryFormat((esp + 0x8), AddrFmt)[0]
        destlen = getBufferLen(dest)
        if (copylen >= destlen):
            self.publish(BOFException(...))
```

0x0400 EBP-FREE SUBS?

- some subs don't start new stack frames using %ebp
 - Windows Libraries
- trouble measuring stack buffer length

0x0401 EBP-FREE SUBS?

- some disassembly required...
- possible solutions:
 - Initial ESP Offset for Stack Allocation
 - Sub Epilog Analysis
 - ret \$0x34
 - add \$0x34, %esp
 - Sub Tracing for %esp Mods
 - 'til ret do us part
 - or jmp
 - OR.... Stack Backtrace for RET

0x0402 Stack Backtracing

- start at %ESP
- loop up the stack by 4 bytes
 - if the current 32-bit number is valid address (maps)
 - look for a “call” opcode immediately before the address
 - if so, is the target address valid?
 - is it a call to memcpy or a call to a jmp to memcpy
 - On Linux, does it target PLT?
- Once found, that location on the stack becomes RET
- Subtract the stack variable from the newly discovered RET location to find the length

0x0403 findRET()

```
def findRET(trace, stackptr = 0):
    cont = True
    stackptr = trace.getRegisterByName('esp')
    while cont:
        stackptr -= 4
        address = trace.readMemoryFormat(stackptr, AddrFmt)[0]
        mymap = trace.getMap(address)
        if mymap != None: # valid address?
            buf = trace.readMemory(address-8, 8)
            for x in range(1,7):
                try:
                    op = Opcode(buf[x:])
                    if (op.off == 8-x and op.opcode[0] == 'c'):
                        target = self.getOperandValue(op.dest)
                        if trace.getMap(target) != None:
                            # Possibly Check the Target of the call
                            # * Costly and not entirely accurate
                            return address
```

(check the latest atlasutils for a much improved version)

0x0404 *findNextHeap()*

```
def findNextHeap(me, address):  
    chain = getConnectedChain(me)  
    for x in xrange(1, len(chain)):  
        if chain[x] > address and chain[x-1] <= address:  
            return chain[x]
```

0x0405 *getConnectionChain()*

- Finds HEAP memory map
- Searches for the first HEAP chunk
- Traverses the forward pointers
 - Keeps track and returns them as a list
- Works on Linux, not tried on Windows yet
- Look for it in the next release of atlasutils

0x0500 strcpy() / strncpy()

- **strcpy** – compare length of source and destination
 - dest pointer can be found at (%ESP + 0x4)
 - source pointer can be found at (%ESP + 0x8)

0x0501 strcpy() / strncpy()

- `strncpy` – compare length of copy (`size_t`) to destination
 - dest pointer can be found at (`%ESP + 0x4`)
 - `size_t` can be found at (`%ESP + 0xc`)

0x0502 *strcat()* / *strncat()*

- similar to *strcpy/strncpy*
- copies source and destination together
- difficult for coders to get right! (ie. often exploitable)
- best to look into logic surrounding *strcat()*
limiting the size of both buffers

0x0600 printf()

- `vfprintf` covers `printf` and `fprintf` in Linux
- what's on the stack for format string?
 - `%ESP + 0x8`
 - does it live in a likely spot?
 - Heap? Stack? `.rodata`?
 - parse format string
 - are there “%” characters in it?

0x0601 *sprintf()*

- vsprintf covers sprintf in Linux
- what's on the stack for format string?
 - %ESP + 0x8
 - does it live in a likely spot?
 - Heap? Stack? .rodata?
 - parse format string
 - are there “%” characters in it?
 - how long of a string can we create?

0x0602 *snprintf()*

- vsnprintf covers snprintf in Linux
- what's on the stack for format string?
 - %ESP + 0x8
 - does it live in a likely spot?
 - Heap? Stack? .rodata?
 - parse format string
 - are there “%” characters in it?
 - how long will the format string allow?
 - how long **can** we write? (%ESP + 0xc)

0x0700 scanf/sscanf/fscanf

- parse format string
 - scanf's is located at %ESP+0x4
 - sscanf's and fscanf's are at %ESP + 0x8
- are there any “%s”?
- if so, where are we storing them?
 - must check each string
 - %45s against a buffer with 32 bytes

0x0800 gets() / fgets()

- lol.
- Just alert. Period.

0x0801 getc() / fgetc()

- loop for getc
- how big is the loop?
- simpler just to identify in disassembly and write up... analysis for which loop mechanism is used is more complex than just eye-balling it.

0x0900 memchr() / memrchr()

- check `size_t` against length of string as in `memcpy`
- may be used to look past a buffer as a potential target or source of data

0x0a00 rep stos/rep movs

- special case.
- need to disassemble code to hook these.
 - Set breakpoint one instruction before
 - stepi() to reach start of opcode
 - Check %ECX against buffer length

0x0b00 Format Strings

- used with printf/scanf families
- %c = 1 byte
- %* = * bytes (depends on the size)
- %#d = at **least** # bytes, possibly more!
- See man page for scanf or printf for more

0x0c00 Are there more?

- you tell me!
- programmatic debugging is fresh turf for new ideas.
- “The force runs strong in your family... Pass on what you have learned...”

0x0d00 choops

- hola y gracias amigos
 - Dios
 - jewel
 - bug
 - ringwraith
 - menace
 - 1@stplace
 - invisigoth and K